Macedonians and Teutons

Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge had scarcely broken off their collaboration on the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher before Marx wrote a scathing critique of Ruge in Vorwärts!, a radical German language paper published in Paris. Marx was criticising an article written by Ruge in the same paper but published anonymously and signed only 'A Prussian'. This was ridiculed by Marx, who constantly refers to Ruge as a "so-called Prussian" etc.[1] Ruge was in fact not a Prussian subject, but it was not simply because it was 'inaccurate' (as Lucio Colletti's introduction to the Penguin edition of the text suggests[2]) that Marx latched onto this so fiercely. Rather, the Young Hegelians were fundamentally embedded in what has been described as a *symbolic topography*, in which great theoretical import was placed on geographical demarcations as a kind of topographical signifiers.[3] This is the tendency in light of which Marx's mockery of Ruge's supposed 'Prussianism' should be read; he is not checking Ruge's passport but his theoretical credentials. In the following, I will first explore this symbolic topography in more detail. Then, on the basis of this, I will argue that (topographical) metaphors matter, and that the diadochal view of Young Hegelianism sketched out above is such a metaphor – it is essentially a metaphor of *empire*, and I will evaluate it as such. Finally, I will offer a different topographical metaphor to that of the (disintegrating) Macedonian empire, namely that of the Teutonic village community.

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[1] Karl Marx, "Critical Notes on the Article 'The King of Prussia and Social Refom. By a Prussian'", in *Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 402.

[2] Lucio Colletti, introductory notes to "Critical Notes on the Article 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian'", by Karl Marx, in *Early Writings*, ed. Lucio Colletti, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 401.

[3] Wolfgang Bunzel and Lars Lambrecht, "Group Formation and Divisions in the Young Hegelian School", in *Politics, Religion, and Art. Hegelian Debates*, ed. Douglas Moggach (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 37-40.

Symbolic topography

The idea of a 'symbolic topography' in general implies the conscious or unconscious ascription of symbolic meaning to topographical features, whether concrete or imagined. An example could be Propertius Sextus's juxtaposition of the Italian city of Baiae with the *domus* of Cynthia, one of the main addressees of his elegies, in which "Each place is described with a style appropriate to it and designed to reinforce the idea that the last state is best".[4] Another example is the role of cities in Jewish theology, where "the distance between their role as places of everyday life and their symbolic status is at the heart of the religious process of mediation between the earthly and heavenly realms", as Gil Klein writes.[5] In the context of Young Hegelianism, Wolfgang Bunzel and Lars Lambrecht—to my knowledge as the first—have introduced the concept of symbolic topography understood as a symbolic system where spatial and geographical differences were also understood as theoretical differences, and in which the latter was actively mapped unto the former, such that "Spatial demarcations were preferred as ways of transferring one's own ideological location into a more broadly understood system of signs".[6] Bunzel and Lambrecht themselves mention two examples. The first is the deliberate choice of Halle as the seat for Ruge and Echtermeyer's journal: Halle had been an important centre of both the Reformation and the early Enlightenment and a home for many feuds between philosophy and theology; it was thus a symbolically loaded place to found a new journal that had as its expressed purpose to defend philosophy's critique of theology, and this was only compounded by its opposition to what was known as the Berliner Jahrbücher, the main organ of official Hegeldom. 'Halle' and 'Berlin' were thus not simply geographical markers but

[4] Charles F. Saylor, "Symbolic Topography in Propertius 1.11", *The Classical Journal* 11, no. 2 (1975), 126.

[5] Gil P. Klein, "The Topography of Symbol: Between Late Antique and Modern Jewish Understanding of Cities", *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 58, no. 1 (2006), 16.

[6] Wolfgang Bunzel and Lars Lambrecht, "Group Formation and Divisions in the Young Hegelian School", in *Politics, Religion, and Art. Hegelian Debates*, ed. Douglas Moggach (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 37.

also symbolic signifiers in a topography of theory.[7] The second of Bunzel and Lambrecht's examples is that of the expression 'A Württemberger', which draws parallels to the above example of Marx's deriding of Ruge's proclaimed Prussianism. When Ruge and Ecthermeyer signed their critical attack on the Prussian state in the article "Karl Streckfuss and Prussianism" (1839) as 'A Wirtemberger' (*sic*), they were not only giving the impression that the article had really been written by D. F. Strauss (who was from Württemberg), they were also implicitly invoking a specific set of political ideas: At the time, as one of the constitutional states of Southern Germany, Würrtemberg was the home and symbol of German constitutionalism and so-called 'Southern liberalism', which stood in opposition to the 'Christian state' of Prussia.[8] While these are both solid examples of the symbolic topography of Young Hegelianism, I believe that we need to have a much deeper understanding and appreciation of the role of such spatial signifiers for the Young Hegelians. While Bunzel and Lambrecht's examples serve well to demonstrate the role that symbolic topography played in the demarcations and divisions internal to the Young Hegelian group (as does, to a certain extent, my own example of Marx and Ruge above), it also played a more positive role in the system building of Young Hegelianism. I will restrict myself here to one example, that of the notion of a European triarchy.

Geography had played an important role already in Hegel's philosophy of history, especially in the form that the Young Hegelians knew it, i.e., through the *Freundesverein* edition of his lectures edited by his son, Karl Hegel. In history, the development of Spirit moved from the East to the West, beginning in Asia, moving through Asia Minor, through 'the riddle of Egypt', and from there to Greece and into Europe where it finds fruition. As such, world history itself is divided by Hegel into geographical regions:

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Bunzel and Lambrecht, "Group Formation and Divisions in the Hegelian School", 38. We should also not forget the important context that *Hegel* was 'a Württemberger'.

Africa, the Orient, Greece and Rome, and Germanic Christendom. Egypt, for example, is the mediation of African sensuousness and the pure Idea of the Orient in a riddle (*Rätsel*) that is eventually solved by the Greek spirit, but it does not thereby destroy either Africa, the Orient, or Egypt – rather, they are preserved as moments in the development of the Hellenic. As Jeremy Pope has argued, in its world-historic function 'Egypt' becomes synonymous with a mediating form of sublation, a form which is thereby transferred onto that geographical signifier itself.[9] However, this historical analysis is given political relevance as well at the end of the *Philosophy of Right.* Here, Hegel famously ends with an analysis of 'World History' in which these geographically bound historical stages are identified with 'national principles' of the nations and their states bound to those geographical territories. It is not only in Europe as a geographical place that Spirit finds its completion in history, it is also the task "assigned to the Nordic principle of the *Germanic peoples*",[10] and any state that is truly an expression of these peoples will therefore be a state that executes this principle. The geographical and spatial is thus not only metaphor but also something that exerts an effect. 'Germanic' or 'Nordic' not only appear in this topographical system of signs as signifiers of a specific stage in the development of Spirit but also exerts influence back on Spirit in its concrete embodiment in the State. *At* this stage, *in* this place, there are certain roads that the State *must* take if it is to be actively real (*Wirklich*) in the Hegelian sense – and these are embodied precisely in the 'Germanic' or in 'Europe'.

For the Young Hegelians, the same kind of thinking about history and geography permeates their thought about history and politics. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the theory of the triarchy. The

[9] Jeremy W. Pope, "Ägypten und Aufhebung. G. W. F. Hegel, W. E. B. Du Bois, and the African Orient", in "W. E. B. Du Bois and the Questions of Another World", special issue, *CR: The New Centennial Review* 8, no. 3 (winter 2006).

[10] G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 379 (§358).

expression comes from Moses Hess's *The European Triarchy* (1841) but the notion can be found throughout. It is the idea that Hegel's notion of the Germanic principle must be supplemented by the principles of other European nations, primarily that of France. As Marx puts it: "When all the inner conditions are met, the *day of the German resurrection* will be heralded by the *crowing of the Gallic cock*".[11] As we have seen in the previous chapter, the perfection of philosophy is, to the Young Hegelians as to Hegel, essentially a German business. When the Young Hegelians speak of 'philosophy', they mean *German* philosophy or, more precisely, *speculative though*, i.e., what some would still today prefer to call *German idealism*, culminating with Hegel. And, as we also saw in the last chapter, the Young Hegelians, like all Hegelians, believed this business to be in principle concluded; philosophy as a distinct sphere of human understanding has reached its highest form. On the other hand, the principle of the French is that of pure practice, i.e., *politics*. In the French revolutions of 1789 and 1830, the political principle had found *its* highest form, as already proto-Young Hegelians like Eduard Gans and Heinrich Heine had observed.[12] Bauer had also analysed the French revolutions in great detail,[13] and Arnold Ruge also gradually became a great believer in the French principle, as his correspondence with Marx over the founding of precisely a French-German journal (i.e., the unification of the two principles) shows. The idea of a 'triarchy' is the supplement of this dialectic between the political and the philosophical principles in the guise of 'Germany' and 'France' respectively with that of *England*, which was seen by Hess as the embodiment of

[11] Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction", in *Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 257.

[12] See, Norbert Waszek, "Eduard Gans on Poverty and on the Constitutional Debate", in *The New Hegelians. Politics and Philosophy in the Hegelian School*, ed. Douglas Moggach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); "War Eduard Gans (1797-1839) die erste Links- oder Junghegelianer?", in *Die linken Hegelianer*, ed. Michael Quante and Amir Mohseni (Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2015); Stathis Kouvelakis, *Philosophy and Revolution. From Kant to Marx* (London: Verso Books, 2019), ch. 2.

[13] Between 1843 and 1847, Bauer, together with his young brother Edgar, Ernst Junglitz, and others, wrote and edited at least seven volumes on (or on topics related to) the French revolutions.

the *social* principle. While it was the task of Germany to realise spiritual freedom and France to realise political freedom, England's task—as the most industrially developed nation and hence the nation in which the so-called 'social question' was also the most developed—was to realise human freedom through social equality.[14] In the same way as the different geographical regions had represented stages in the development of world history and Spirit to Hegel, to Hess the three main European nations represented the three necessary aspects of the (socialist) perfection of humanity in human freedom.[15] More importantly, Hess himself couples this notion with that of a geographical symbolism in noting the 'geographical basis of history', a consequence of the appearance of "the future" as a factor "in the field of speculation" (i.e., philosophy).[16] As can be gauged from the above, the spatial and the topographical is not only relevant as a symbolic system of signs in the negative delimitation or demarcation of the field of Young Hegelianism, but also—and more pointedly—in the positive theory-building of the Young Hegelians. It is not because they are divided that the Young Hegelians apply these topographical signifiers in acts of demarcations, it is because of a shared commitment to the theoretical importance of the spatial in history that they use them when the need for demarcation arises. As we saw in the previous chapter, the difference is not *in abstracto* but rather in the concrete; they are concrete differences over a shared commonality.

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[14] Gareth Stedman Jones, "Engels and the Invention of the Catastrophist Conception of the Industrial Revolution", in Moggach, *The New Hegelians*, 215.

[15] It does not take much work or imagination to recognise this model in the works of Marx and, especially, in the later Marxist tradition inaugurated by Engels and culminating in Lenin's "The Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism" (1913) where these are identified as precisely "the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism". *Collected Works*, volume 19, trans. George Hanna (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 21.

[16] Moses Hess, *Die europäische Triarchie* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1841), 24 ff.

The metaphor of empire

Förster's comparison of Hegel with Alexander and, by implication, of the Hegelians with the diadochi, is, by extension, precisely such a topographical or spatial metaphor. As Robert Sack notes, "space… provides a fundamental ordering system interlacing every facet of thought", [17] but as we have also seen, the Young Hegelians not only think in spatial terms, they also apply geography as metaphors in a topographical system of signs, i.e., as symbols or signifiers standing in for some concrete that is thereby signified. However, as Althusser notes in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1970), spatial metaphors can also limit understanding, as is the case, so Althusser claims, with the spatial metaphor of edifice implied in terms like 'base' and 'superstrucure'. These terms immediately "suggests something, makes something visible", he says, and he continues: "Precisely this: that the upper floors could not 'stay up' (in the air) alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base".[18] By employing the metaphor alone, a theoretical point has already been made which demands certain features and precludes certain possibilities. While metaphors can open understanding, they can also serve to close thinking. Ellen Meiksins Wood, though highly critical of Atlhusser's solution to the problem, says something similar in *Democracy against Capitalism* (1995), simply stating that, "The base/superstructure metaphor has always been more trouble than it is worth."[19]

What does the metaphor of empire suggest? What features does it demand, which does it preclude? In his recent investigation of empire as a topic for philosophy, James Alexander begins by claiming that

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[17] Robert David Sack, *Conceptions of Space in Social Thought. A Geographical Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 1980), 4.

[18] Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward and Investigation", in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 135.

[19] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism. Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 49.

empire has *not* been a topic for philosophers—as opposed, for example, to the *polis*—because it has always been "dynamic rather than static. It has, in short, been too capricious, too changeable, too *human*", full of contraries and shifting tendencies.[20] While Alexander claims that they have not managed to bridge the gap to philosophical enquiry, there have been modern historical and political investigations of 'empire'. From these, we can gauge some preliminary characteristics of empire, which might also inform our understanding of the metaphor. First, empires are always politically fragmented. Even in the most paradigmatic cases, they are fragmented, differentiated, and "encased in irregular, porous, and sometimes undefined borders", as Laura Benton notes.[21] Interestingly, she also notes that in light of this, *geography* comes to play an important symbolic role: "Descriptions of geographic elements such as rivers, oceans, islands, and highlands were creatively combined with discourses about law".[22] Second, empires are expansive. They cover a lot of territory, and there is a consciousness of expansion into this territory in recent memory. It is within this large and expansive territory that the fragmentation and differentiation described by Benton sets in, a differentiation which is maintained and utilised in a system of hierarchy, notes Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper. [23] While there is likely to be a strong, centralised power in charge of the empire, this fragmented hierarchy of local elites are enlisted in its management, Charles Maier adds. [24] To sum up, from an empirical and historical point of view, empires tend to be 1) large political entities, which 2) maintain differences and fragmentation, and in which 3) a central power

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[20] James Alexander, "Empire as a Subject for Philosophy (*Polis*, *Imperium*, *Cosmopolis*)", in *Philosophy* 94, no. 2 (April 2019), 243.

[21] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty. Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.

[22] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 7.

[23] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 8.

[24] Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires. American Ascendency and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 31, 33.

employs this hierarchy of difference and fragmentation in order to govern. To this we might add the following points from Alexander's investigation: An empire (or *imperium*) is a type of state, which ideally understands itself to the be the only state in the world as opposed to, on opposite sides, the *polis* which sees itself as one state among many in the world, and the *cosmopolis* which sees itself as (identical to) the entire world itself.[25] Following the Chinese scholar Kung-chuan Hsiao, Alexander calls this 'political solipsism', a tendency which he, with a term from Collingwood, describes as 'primitive survival', i.e., "something which though we may formally and collectively abandon it through a process of civilisation, remains an ineliminable atavistic impetus."[26] To the empire, then, there is no justified enemy; all other societies must simply be subdued under imperial rule or be destroyed. Only recognition from oneself is necessary. In practicality, a concrete empire rarely has dominion over the entire world, but the point is that in a state (in the double sense) of *imperium*, this *ought* to be the case. However, the dynamic of empire enters precisely when it is not the case: the state rises and falls historically, depending on how far its dominion stretches at any given time. Rome is not one thing (in the sense that Athens the *polis* is also Athens the city); it is something else in 50 B.C. than in 200 A.D. – and similarly with the British, or the Mongol, or the Aztec empires. Empires have no fixed borders, only temporary ones.[27] To sum up, Alexander adds the following to our previous characteristics: empire *a*) sees itself as the only (legitimate) state in the world, it *b*) needs only its own recognition in order to believe this, and *c*) for this reason it is constantly expanding and without fixed borders.

[25] Alexander, "Empire as a Subject for Philosophy", 246.
[26] Alexander, "Empire as a Subject for Philosophy", 252.
[27] Alexander, "Empire as a Subject in Philosophy", 250.

I would argue that in the diadochal metaphor Alexander the Great's kingdom lives up to at least 1-3 while Hegel's certainly lives up to not only 1-3 but also *a*, *b*, and *c*.

Firstly, Hegel's 'empire' is certainly large. By its nature, it was supposed to encompass all human knowledge with old forms of consciousness being sublated into and retained within the new and higher forms. Secondly, however, it also maintained differentiation: while it was large in scope, it was also encyclopaedic, i.e., distinguished between different forms, modes, and stages of knowledge (politics, religion, art, philosophy, etc.). Thirdly, it employed a clear hierarchy with philosophy at the top as the science of Spirit, managing things throughout in the *Logic* in the form of the ordering Concept, from the end of the *Phenomenology* as the finally realised Absolute Knowledge, or from the centre of world history as the cunning Reason.

As for points *a* through *c*, Hegel's philosophy certainly sees itself as the only one in the world; in the mind of Hegel, his philosophy is not just *a* philosophy, rather it is simply *the* philosophy. While there might be other forms of thinking (cf. the point above about differentiation and hierarchy), his system is the only one that can lay claim to truly being philosophy and not simply an inferior mode of thought. Second, it needs only its own recognition in order to believe this. The legitimacy of the Hegelian system within the history of philosophy is, in Hegel's view, conferred by that history itself. While other, inferior modes of human thought like art and religion need philosophy to evaluate their content and sublate it into an appropriate form, philosophy itself is this form and needs only itself. Third, Hegel's empire of mind is constantly expanding: Spirit is everything, and had Hegel not died at the age of 61 there is no reason to think we would have stopped with the spheres of human understanding he had so far subjected

to the might of the dialectic – just as Alexander had plans to conquer all of Northern Africa next, before the fever took him in Babylon.[28] Hegel's system was, as already mentioned, encyclopaedic in nature.

Where does this leave us? We might be left with the impression that Förster was absolutely right in comparing Hegel to Alexander and that the metaphor of empire that this suggests was entirely appropriate. That might be the case. However, my contention is that the analogy this suggests for the Hegelians (that of diadochi), at least, is not.

In the Young Hegelian village

What is the alternative to empire? Alexander gives us two options, *polis* and *cosmopolis*, of which the former is more relevant to us here. It is a state, which, unlike the empire, has as its primary characteristics that it is "limited, bounded, and static".[29] If, like in an empire, power emanates out from a centre, then it does not just fizzle out but hits a hard limit when it meets the border of another state; "Any crossing of the line is a breach of custom, a breaking of law, damage to the system of states"[30] – in other words, *an act of war*. Burbank and Cooper tells us quite the same thing, namely that the opposite of empire is the single territory that considers itself as a singular, sovereign political community, "proclaiming the commonality of its people".[31] As regards the Young Hegelians, in the metaphorical language of empire and diadochi, this was what the empire collapsed into when the powerful figure of the king unexpectedly died. Each of the polities of Hegel's empire became its own 'singular, sovereign community' – with different of his

[28] Robin Waterfield, *Dividing the Spoils. The War for Alexander the Great's Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11.
[29] Alexander, "Empire as a Subject for Philosophy", 247.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*, 8.

former loyal subjects taking up residence and kingship in each. In the words of Löwith, they divided Hegel's empire into provinces and from there, "each tries to outdo the other in a process of mutual cannibalism".[32] It is a state a war, and such a state can only exists between singular and sovereign *poleis*, since no state of war can truly exist for the empire, since that would imply other states. To Hegel as well, other 'philosophies' where not philosophies at all; they were not enemy states to be defeated, simply foreign peoples to be subsumed under the *Pax Hegelianum*. At least, this is the model of integration that the metaphor of empire suggests. It is a metaphor of disintegration; of an empire falling apart into warring provinces; of one empire becoming instead many kingdoms; of conflict and civil war. This immediately 'suggests something, makes something visible', as Althusser says, namely a certain interpretation of the relationship between the Young Hegelians – certain features are demanded and certain possibilities precluded, as it were. It suggests a relationship of conflict and civil war her as well; that the Young Hegelians were only ever in conflict with each other; that they viewed each other only as obstacles and opponents on the quest toward domination – toward the transition from many *poleis* back to one *imperium*.

However, as we have seen in the previous chapter this could not be further from the truth of Young Hegelianism if it tried. While the Young Hegelians did disagree, and indeed did so vehemently, and while they argued over details big and small, they did so on the common ground of a specific understanding of philosophy and history in general as well as Hegel's philosophy specifically. While the metaphor of empire might be useful in opening our understanding Hegel, it most definitely also serves to close our thinking when it comes to the Young Hegelians. Instead, I want to suggest a different topographical metaphor. Staying with the Iron Age theme, rather than infighting Macedonians in a disintegrating empire, I want to

[32] Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche. The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought*, trans. David E. Green (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1991), 66-67

suggest that we think of the Young Hegelians as collaborating Teutons in thriving Germanic village community, tilling the plentiful fields of Hegelianism together in the day and enjoying their supper in the halls of the Hegelian longhouse in the evening (or maybe, given the Young Hegelians' preference for the *Bierstuben* of Berlin, the Hegelian mead hall).

This might seem like a silly change, but let me try to make the suggestion otherwise. First, let me simply remind the reader that we are still *telling a story*. As was remarked in the previous chapter, not everything can be said and we, like everybody else, whether consciously or not, have to construct a narrative in order to understand the topic at hand. Metaphors help tell stories. Second, I want to take up Franco Moretti's point that imagining and even literally picturing things in new ways also opens up new avenues of understanding: "it offers a model of the narrative universe which rearranges its components in a non-trivial way, and may bring some hidden patterns to the surface".[33] The 'it' of which Moretti speaks is *maps*, not metaphors. But since our metaphor is precisely topographical, we can also draw a map of the Young Hegelian village (*fig. 2*).

[33] Franco Moretti, *Graphs, Maps, Trees. Abstract Models for Literary Theory* (London: Verso Books, 2005), 54.



Fig. 2. The Young Hegelian village.

Here, I have attempted to map out what that village could look like with each of the dots representing one of the main characters from our story in the previous chapter. What does the map show us? In Althusser's words, what does it make visible? Precisely this: We (literally) see that the Young Hegelians are not as divided as we might first assume when we view each of them as an independent warlord in a disintegrating empire. Instead, when we place them in the symbolic topography of Young Hegelianism by grouping them together in the different houses of the village's many homesteads, we see that they enter into changing relationships, groups, and alliances – both over time and topically. While Marx and Bauer, for example, live in the same house when it comes to religion, they stand fundamentally opposed in the

field of politics (while Stirner stands outside political groupings altogether). Vis-à-vis the masses, Marx and Hess stand alone, but when it comes to the state they have many housemates. This opens up a new way of seeing the interrelations of the Young Hegelians that furthers ideas of collaboration rather than infighting while at the same time acknowledging that the Young Hegelians at different times formed different parties and groups. However, at the end of the day, all of them sit united in the Hegelian longhouse at the village's centre. The map reveals a simple fact which the spatial metaphor of the diadochi obscures, namely that *the Young Hegelians acted not as atomised individuals but as interchanging, clustered units*. This also enables us to understand that, as we shall see in the next part of this dissertation, while Marx moves position several times during the 1840s and even later, that in itself does not mean that he moves out of the Young Hegelian village altogether.